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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is at issue in this appeal and is fully briefed*
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Does this court have jurisdiction over this appeal when

the notice of appeal was filed before a final order was issued by
the trial court, and that final order disposed of what was arguably
a Rule 59 motion?
There is no applicable standard of review, as this Court
considers its own jurisdiction originally.
As to the merits, Reeves agree that this Court reviews all of
the issues in this appeal de novo.
796, 802-03

(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P. 2d
Reeves differ, however, with

Steinfeldt's framing of the issues, and to the degree Reeves differ
they would frame them as follows:
2.

Did

the

trial

court

correctly

rule

that

Steinfeldt

contractually bound himself as to when he could file a mechanics'
lien, and that he breached that contract by filing prematurely?
3.

Did the trial court correctly rule that Steinfeldt could

not "cure" his defective filing with a subsequent filing?
4.

Did the trial court correctly deny prejudgment interest to

Steinfeldt?
5.

Did the trial court correctly deny Steinfeldt attorney

fees?

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 (attached sa Appendix 1 ) .
Other rules or statutes determinative of the appeal have been
attached to the appellant's brief.
I rATEMENT III 'I'M I < ASE
The case has been properly stated by the appellant, with the
exception that this Court must consider whether it has jurisdiction
over t fie appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Steinfeldt has chosen to state the facts as gleaned
select portions of the record

1 his is inappropriate.

from

He chooses

to interpret the record—the task of the trial court—rather than
restate the facts as found
notwithstanding

the

fact

by the trial court.
that

he

whatsoever to the court's findings.

has

leveled

He does this
no

challenge

See Docketing Statement of

Defendant-Appellant (no mention of a factual challenge or statement
of a clearly erroneous standard of review).

This Court should

disregard his references to the record, inasmuch as Steinfeldt has
not marshalled the evidence as required to make an evidentiary
challenge.

See In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah

1989) . Reeves here restate the facts as found by the court (see R.
265-61) -1

1

Part of this case was decided on summary judgment, which might
suggest that the facts should be read in Steinfeldt's favor. However,
the summary judgment only resolved whether the written contract between
the parties was ambiguous, a legal task in any event. Thus, no factual
challenges to the factual findings are before this Court.
2

Reeves owned property in Lindon, Utah, and Steinfeldt acted as
the general contractor to build a home for Reeves on the property.
After approximately the framing stage of construction, the parties
discussed and reached a revised agreement dated August 9, 1993, as
to Steinfeldt7s work in constructing the home.

The agreement was

reduced to writing and stated:
At close of house, Thad Steinfeldt will be
paid $10,000 which will be payment in full for
labor and services concerning Shawn & Julie
Reeves 7 house at 53 W. 650 N. Lindon, Utah.
This in addition to regular $300\week supervi
sion fees and hourly wages of $20 approved in
advance for any necessary changes.
$14,000
contractor fee in loan is null and void.
S/ T.B. Steinfeldt
S/ S.F. Reeves
The

agreement

compensation.
and

Reeves

governed

the

method

and

time

of

Steinfeldt7s

Steinfeldt failed to complete the work as promised,

were

forced

complete the house.

to

procure

substitute

performance

to

Reeves had made all payments to Steinfeldt

required by their agreement through the date of the last draw in
October, 1993.
On November 5, 1993, Steinfeldt filed a lien against Reeves'
property in the sum of $17,929.

Because Steinfeldt had placed the

lien on the property, Reeves were required to escrow 150% of the
lien

amounts

in

order

to

close

their

long-term

financing.

Steinfeldt amended the lien on or about December 22, 1993, reducing
the claimed amount to $12,764.19, and a portion of the escrowed
funds were released.

Reeves 7 damages were found to include labor

3

charges for Steinfeldt's replacement and interest on the extra
escrow monies.
After having filed an amended complaint, Reeves moved for
partial summary judgment.

The court granted Reeves' motion and

ruled that the language of the written agreement of 1 august 9, 1993
(1) voided any prior agreements between the parties; (2) was clear
and unambiguous, and (3) it should be enforced as written.
After

trial,

the

court

concluded

that

while

R. 196.

Steinfeldt

was

entitled to the benefit of the August 9 agreement, he had filed the
lien in excess of his entitlement, and his filing was premature
inasmuch as Steinfeldt was tc be paid at the time of closing and
not sooner.

R. 2 35, 3 07.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

This Court lacks jurisdiction,

Steinfeldt

filed two

motions after issuance of the trial court's memorandum decision.
Steinfeldt then filed his notice of appeal before the trial court
had disposed of those motions,
premature and had no effect.

thus the notice of appeal was
The same is true for the extension

for time to file a notice of appeal: one cannot extend the time to
file something that cannot yet be filed.
II.

A mechanic's lien, like any other lien, requires both

attachment and perfection. Attachment occurs automatically through
the statute, but perfection requires filing by the lienor.

The

statute provides for a "window" of time when that perfection can
occur.

That window begins with the "substantial completion" of the

4

work and, under the statute in this case, ended eighty days later.
The trial court made a correct and critical distinction between an
agreement which would bar a lien entirely and an agreement which
would

determine the time

opportunity would run.

from which the eighty-day

window of

The trial court called the agreement a

"limited lien waiver" because it affected the time when the lien
could be filed.

Under general principles of law, no lien may be

properly filed until payment is due.

Payment is normally due when

the work is substantially complete and accepted by the owner, but
when, as here, the payment due date is changed, the right to file
a lien begins when payment is due and has not been made.

It would

be absurd to think that a contractor could file a lien to recover
monies which were not yet due.
Here the parties contracted as to the time for payment in a
perfectly permissible way.

Steinfeldt breached that contract by

filing his lien prematurely and for an excessive amount.

His

subsequent filing of a second lien did not "cure" the original
filing, as the statute does not contemplate such a "cure", and, in
any event, the work had not yet been accepted by Reeves.
III.

Steinfeldt cannot recover attorney fees because he is

not the prevailing party.

There can be only one prevailing party

under the statute, and the trial court deemed Reeves the prevailing
party.
IV.

Steinfeldt

may

not

recover

prejudgment

interest.

Prejudgment interest is only available for those debts whose exact

5

amount is subject to determination by the factfinder.

Here, the

amount due Steinfeldt was disputed and eventually determined by the
factfinder.

Thus, no prejudgment interest may be awarded.
ARGUMENT

I.

Steinfeldt Filed His Notice of Appeal Prior To Disposition < :>f
a Post-Trial Motion and, Therefore, This Court Has No
Jurisdiction Over This Appeal.
Before responding to Steinfeldt's substantive issues, Reeves

must first raise a challeng

.,.-•*

arisdicti on.

A

jurisdictional argument can be raised at any time, even at oral
argument.

Swenson Associates Architects v. Utah, 889 P.2d 415

(Utah 1994) .
The challenge to jurisdiction is predicated on the timing of
Steinfeldt's notice of appeal, which was filed before the trial
court' s disposition of a Rule 59 motion.
case's

docket

is

necessary

to

an

1 \ chr onology of this
understanding

of

the

jurisdictional issues:
1.

September 12, 1994.

Memorandum decision issued

which

Reeves' motion for partial summary judgment is granted, counsel to
prepare an appropriate order.
2.

October 17, 1994. Memorandum decision issued after trial

in favor of Reeves.
order.
3.

R. 196.

Reeves' counsel to prepare an appropriate

R. 235.
October

25,

Reconsideration" is filed.

1994.
R. 238.

6

Steinfeldt's

"Motion

for

4.

November 4, 1994.

Judge Harding signs the Judgment and

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
5.

November 8, 1994.

R. 261, 266.

Steinfeldt's Objection to Plaintiff's

Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed.
6.

December 2, 1994.

R. 272.

Judge Harding signs an Order granting

Steinfeldt's ex parte motion for an extension of time to file
notice of appeal.
7.

R. 296.

December 8, 1994.

Judge Harding issues a Memorandum

Decision denying Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration.
counsel to submit an appropriate order.
8.

December 27, 1994.

9.

January 3, 1995.

Reeves'

R. 298.

Notice of appeal filed.

R. 306.

Judge Harding signs an Order disposing

of Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration and Objection.

R. 3 07.

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that a notice
of appeal filed while a Rule 59 motion is pending has no effect and
does not take effect upon disposition of the motion.

Here the

motion for reconsideration and the objections to the findings of
fact and conclusions of law were treated by the trial court as Rule
59 motions, and thus the ex parte extension of time to file a
notice of appeal was ineffectual.
In

this

case

a

"Motion

for

Reconsideration",

brought

ostensibly under Rule 54 (see R. 246 (supporting memorandum citing
Ron Shepherd, a Rule 54 case)) , was filed after announcement of the
trial court's decision but before the signing of the final order.
However, when the court issued its final order on November 4, 1994,

7

it did so without disposing of the outstanding motion.

Despite

Steinfeldt's styling of his motion as a rule 54 motion, the court's
December 17, 1994 Order removed any doubt that the court did not
consider the motion to be a Rule 54 motion, but rather a Rule 59
motion.

The

court

did

not

dispose

of

the

motion

for

reconsideration until after the December 17 Order had been signed.
The Court, therefore, treated the motion as a Rule 59 motion.
Even if the motion for reconsideration was not a Rule 59
motion, Steinfeldt's "objection", filed four days after the entry
of the court's November 4 Order, was clearly a Rule 59 motion.
"Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion filed within ten days

of the entry of judgment that questions
court's

findings

and conclusions

the

correctness

of

the

is properly treated as a post-

judgment motion under either Rules 52(b) or 59(e)."

Debry v.

Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 520, 522-23 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (emphasis supplied) ; see Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991); Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854 P.2d 555, 557 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) .
Given these facts, Steinfeldt could not have timely filed his
notice of appeal until January 3, 1995, or within thirty days after
that date.
(Utah 1994). 2

Swenson Associates Architects v. Utah, 889 P. 2d 415
This result is unchanged notwithstanding Steinfeldt

2

This is true even considering Judge Harding , s granting of the
extension of time to file the notice of appeal.
The notice was
ineffective given the pending post-judgment motion. Because Steinfeldt
did not file a timely notice of appeal, his appeal must be dismissed.
See U.R.A.P. 2 (provisions of Rule 4(b) may not be suspended).
8

not receiving actual notice that its motion may still have been
pending.
notice

When a time period runs from the time of filing,

is irrelevant.

a party is always

actual

Since the court's docket is a public record,
on constructive notice of a filing.

Steinfeldt

therefore knew from the contents of the Order that a motion was
pending, and if he did not, he could have requested a clarification
from the court or, more simply, filed his notice of appeal and then
diligently checked with the clerk's office, every day if need be,
to ensure that the court filed no further dispositive orders that
could be treated as final. Notice of an order is not required for
the time for filing a notice of appeal to accrue.

See U.R.C.P.

58A(d)("The prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and shall file
proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court.

However, the time for filing
the notice

requirements

a notice

of this

of appeal is not affected

provision.")(emphasis

by

supplied);

Workman v. Nagle. 802 P.2d 749 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
It was Steinfeldt's duty to determine whether the motions he
filed may have been disposed of upon entry of what was styled a
final order.

When there is any doubt as to whether a motion

remains outstanding, the party filing the motion has the burden of
requesting a ruling or for an extension of the time to appeal.
That is what this Court and the Supreme Court have required. See,
e.g. , Swenson Associates Architects v. Utah, 889 P. 2d 415 (Utah
1994) .
Steinfeldt did not do this, and his appeal must be
dismissed.
9

II. Steinfeldt Did Not "Waive" His Right To Pile a Mechanic's
Lien, But Rather Contractually Fixed the Time For Filing a Lien,
and Then Breached the Contract by Prematurely Filing.
Steinfeldt argues that the trial Court found the August 9
agreement to be a "waiver" of his right to file a mechanic's lien.
The trial court did not so hold.

Steinfeldt did not waive his

right to file a lien: he simply contracted as to the time he could
file a lien, and his right to file a lien was therefore only
impaired in a limited fashion, if at all.

Steinfeldt confuses his

right to file a lien at all with his right to file a lien at
particular

time.

a

The statute prescribes both rights: one may file

a lien, and one has a particular "window" of time in which to do
so.

Steinfeldt willingly defined the borders of that window by

contract, but still retained the right to file a lien.
A. Steinfeldt Did Not Waive His Right to File a Lien,
But Rather Fixed the Date He Could File a Lien.
The mechanic's lien statute applicable to this action states
that "Each contractor or other person who claims benefits under
this chapter within 80 days after substantial completion of the
project

or

improvement

recorder . . .

shall

file for record with the

a written notice to hold and claim a lien."

Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (1993).

states

"substantial

that

a

completion"

Utah

Steinfeldt contracted to fix the date

on which he could file a lien—the closing date.
statute

county

lien
of

may
the

not

be

project

Furthermore, the

filed
or

until

after

improvement.

Substantial completion obviously means "completion", as in all work
being completed.

Nagle v. Club Fountainbleu, 405 P.2d 346 (Utah
10

1965) (date of "completion11 disputed; date of completion was crucial
date for commencing statutory period to file lien).

But the date

of "substantial completion" also means the date when only minor or
trivial work remains to be accomplished, Interiors Contracting v.
Smith, Halander & Smith, 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 771 P.2d 1100,
1102

(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 781 P. 2d 878

(Utah 1989).

Furthermore, the requirements for filing a lien are not satisfied
until

the

owner

has

accepted

the

lienor's

work.

Interiors

Contracting, 827 P.2d at 965.
The trial court correctly held that Steinfeldt breached the
contract it made by prematurely filing a mechanic's lien before the
closing date

(the date of substantial completion) .3

language of the trial court's ruling is significant.

The exact

It ruled that

the written agreement constituted a "limited lien waiver."
word "limited" is important.

The

The court obviously doubted whether

specifying the date of payment could constitute a "waiver" of the
right

to

place

a

mechanics'

lien.

Steinfeldt

ignores

the

limitation the court placed on the term "waiver", and spends much

3

Steinfeldt has also argued that by contractually fixing the
date of payment at closing, a contractor could end up with no right of
lien because closing occurred more than 90 days after "substantial
completion."
The term "substantial completion" is a benchmark,
subject to judicial interpretation so that the statute makes sense.
If, as here, the parties in Steinfeldt's hypothetical simply intend to
fix a lien's time of perfection, then it offends reason to think that
the term "substantial completion" would mean anything but closing. The
parties can always contract for when "substantial completion" occurs.
Here, that time was closing.
11

time discussing general waiver when general waiver was not really
at issue ion this case.4

4

Reeves recognize that Steinfeldt has spent a great deal of time
on this issue, and so addresses it here in a footnote. Even if the
modification were deemed a "waiver", it was still binding. Steinfeldt
suggests that the modification was improper in form (it was not
"express"). However, all of the cases that Steinfeldt cites concern
total waivers, not situations where one is simply proscribed from
filing one's lien until a certain time and to a certain amount.
Steinfeldt was free to file a lien within such parameters, and admits
as much: "Steinfeldt, by agreement, was not going to be paid until
the
closing
of the Reeves'
home, and to protect such payment filed a notice
of mechanic's lien . . . ." Brief of the Appellant at 13 (emphasis
supplied). He never says he could not file a lien at the appropriate
time. Steinfeldt argues that he is entitled, on public policy grounds,
that because he is nervous about payment before completion of the
house, he is entitled to file a lien. Such conduct is most assuredly
against
public policy and is an abuse of a statutory lien.
Furthermore, no Utah authority speaks to whether waiving the right
to file a mechanics' lien must be express in the sense that they must
say "this a waiver of your lien." Steinfeldt has cited Utah authority
that a waiver of lien must be clear and unambiguous, as any waiver
must.
The only mechanics' lien case he cites is Mine and Smelter
Supply Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 471 P.2d 154 (Utah 1970),
which is not in point: that case discussed an incredible latent
ambiguity (the work performed could not enjoy a lien because the work
was on a public building).
Here the agreement was unambiguous:
Steinfeldt agreed on price and timing as clear new terms. There was no
ambiguity to the agreement.
The cases Steinfeldt cites from Colorado and Oregon do not change
this conclusion. See Racrsdale Bros. Roofing v. United Bank, 744 P. 2d
750, 754-55 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Harris v. Dver, 623 P.2d 662, 665
(Or. Ct. App. 1981). Accepting arguendo
these authorities as binding
on Utah courts, they do not help Steinfeldt. Harris is illustrative.
That court held that an arbitration clause could not constitute an
express waiver because liquidating the debt (the task of arbitration)
was not the same as collecting it (the task of a lien) . Thus, agreeing
to arbitration does not mean one waives the ways in which to enforce
the arbiter's judgment.
Here, Steinfeldt agreed in the August 9
contract to a specific date to fix Jboth the amount due him and the time
when he could collect that amount. Because the agreement constitutes
a temporary forbearance of the right to record a mechanics' lien, it is
an express waiver of the right to record the lien at the earliest
moment that might be allowed under the statute.
Steinfeldt seems to argue that for a waiver to be effective, it
must spell out the applicable law of mechanic's liens, including the
timing requirements of those liens.
For the agreement here to be
12

Indeed, it is more sensible to speak of the August 9 agreement
as a modification, and not a waiver, of Steinfeldt's rights.

The

ways in which one may modify one's rights to use or forebear from
using the remedy of a mechanics' lien are not limited, just as the
ways in which one may contract are not limited.
Mechanics''

Liens

§

Investors v. C.N

334

(1970);

see

Zundel. 600 P.2d

First

521, 527

See 53 Am. Jur. 2d

of

Denver

Mortgage

(Utah 1979).

This

approach makes sense given that the court's ruling labeled the
written agreement as a "limited" lien waiver.
B.
Steinfeldt Breached the Contract by Filing His Lien
Prematurely.
The timing requirements of the statute clearly contemplate a
"window" in which liens can be filed.

The window is defined on one

side as the date of substantial completion, and on the other as the
expiration of the 80 days.

Were this not so, no one would argue

whether work had been substantially completed, as that date would
have little relevance: a contractor could walk off the job at any
time

and

file

his

completion or not.

lien,

whether

there

had

been

substantial

Steinfeldt argues that "[tjhere is no statutory

prohibition that would restrain the laborer from filing a notice of

unambiguous in the sense that Steinfeldt suggests, it would not only
have had to say that payment was due at the time of closing, but also
say something like "Now, you realize that the Utah code allows you to
file a lien only when payment is due you, and that such time now means
the closing (or, in any event the date of substantial completion) . So,
you cannot file your lien until closing or substantial completion
(which here are essentially the same), and you will be limited to the
amount agreed upon." Requiring such surplusage is ludicrous and simply
not necessary.
13

lien on the first day work is performed—long before the eighty
(80) day period starts to run."
Steinfeldt

is

wrong:

the

without such a prohibition.

Brief of the Appellant at 17.

statute

would

be

self-contradictory

The prohibition is implicit. The date

of substantial completion commences the period in which a filing
may

occur.

Interiors

Assocs, 827 P.2d

Contracting v.

963, 965

Smith, Halander

(Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("A

& Smith

contract is

'completed' and the 100-day filing period begins to run when the
work has been

'substantially completed,' leaving only minor or

trivial work to be accomplished, and 'has been accepted by the
owner.'"); Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan, 771 P. 2d
1101, 1102

(Utah Ct. App.)("A general contractor must record a

mechanic's

lien

within

100

days

after

completion

of

the

contract."), cert, denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989).
When Steinfeldt filed his lien on the Reeves property, there
had been no substantial completion of the construction for which he
had been hired.

The parties chose the day of closing as the day on

which Steinfeldt would be paid.

Their choice made sense, for even

absent a contract, the day of closing is a convenient and reliable
date for fixing substantial completion.
until after November 5, 1993.

Closing did not occur

It violates common sense to suppose

that Steinfeldt could decree the date of substantial completion as
the date he quit working on the job: such would mean that the date
of substantial completion means the date of breach.
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In any event,

Reeves had not accepted Steinfeldt's work before he filed the lien.
His filing was therefore premature.
C.
The Lien Was Recorded Wrongfully
Overstated the Amount Due Steinfeldt.

Because

It

In arguing that he was justified in claiming more than the
agreement allowed, Steinfeldt insists on ignoring the payment terms
of the agreement.

Steinfeldt obviously refuses to be bound by his

contractual obligations.

He has argued that the payment date did

not apply to him. Next he disputes the amount owed him. The trial
court did not condone this approach, and when crafting its remedy
it held Steinfeldt to the contract.

As noted before, the court

deemed the agreement a "limited" waiver of Steinfeldt's right to
file a lien, limited because it only proscribed the timing and
amount of payment on which a lien could be predicated.

Steinfeldt

was bound by these contractual obligations in addition to the safe
harbor requirements of the mechanic's lien statute that he cites in
his brief. Violating either the statutory or contract requirements
constituted wrongful conduct, and the trial court so ruled.
D. The Amended Filing Did Not Cure The Original Filing,
and There Was no Acceptance by Reeves.
For the same reason that the original filing was premature,
the second "amendment" to the filing was invalid.

Steinfeldt

appears to contend that the amended filing in some way "cured" the
defect of the original filing because the amendment took place
after payment was due.

This is not so, for several reasons.

The

amended lien still claimed an amount in excess of what was due.
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Even were the amended lien not excessive and based on the parties'
binding understanding, there is no authority that a wrongfully
filed lien can be "cured" in such a manner.

Under a plain reading

of the statute, the wrongfully filed lien must be withdrawn, and a
new lien filed in full accordance with the statute.

Furthermore,

"curing" the lien, even if this were possible, does not remedy the
damages

suffered

by

the

Reeves

in

having

wrongfully filed lien of November 5, 1993.

to

deal

with

the

Steinfeldt's post hoc

attempt to cure the lien cannot insulate him from damages arising
from

the

original

slanderous

filing.

Lastly,

the

threshold

requirement that the Reeves accept Steinfeldt's work, Interiors
Contracting v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs, 827 P.2d 963, 965
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), had still not been fulfilled at the time of
the amendment, and therefore the period for filing had not yet
begun.

The amendment cured nothing.

III.

Steinfeldt Is Not Entitled to Prejudgment Interest.

Steinfeldt claims prejudgment interest on the amount due him.
Beyond

a

general

prayer

for

"interest"

in

his

Counterclaim

(Appendix 6) , Steinfeldt never raised the issue of prejudgment
interest with the district court, neither at trial nor in his
motion

for reconsideration.

This issue should be disregarded

because it was waived.
Even were the issue validly before this Court,
[t]he law on this issue is clear: M, [W]here the damage is
complete and the amount of loss is fixed as of a
particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts
and figures, interest should be allowed from that time .
16

. . and not from the date of judgment.
on the other
hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be
calculated with mathematical accuracy, such as in the
case of personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of
character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the
damages must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of
fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest
is not allowed.'"
Cornia v. Wilcox, 267 U.A.R. 40, 44 (Utah June 28, 1995)(quoting
Canyon

Country

Store

v.

Bracey,

781

P.2d

414,

422

(Utah

1989) (quoting First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 653
P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982))).
In Cornia the court denied prejudgment
factfinder

was

charged

with

using

ascertaining and assessing the damages."

"its
Id.

interest when the
best

judgment

That is what Judge

Harding did here with respect to Steinfeldt's damages.
due Steinfeldt was disputed.

in

The amount

The origin of the dispute centered on

whether Steinfeldt had completed the job, and so it was disputed
whether the entire $10,000 fee enumerated in the contract was due.
R. 339-40, 398-99.

Other disputed figures included the number of

supervisory hours to be charged, R. 335-36, 338, 339-40, 398-99,
and what expenses were compensable. R. 3 3 9-40.

Judge Harding's

Findings

resolved

disputes.
IV.

of

Fact

specifically

addressed

and

these

R. 263 (Finding 12).
Steinfeldt Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees.

Steinfeldt argues that he is entitled to attorney fees under
the statute.

He is wrong.

Steinfeldt is only entitled to fees if

he is a successful party in an action to enforce a mechanics' lien.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18.

Steinfeldt has not been granted the
17

right to

foreclose

on his

lien, nor has he been awarded

any

damages.

The only reason he is still a creditor of Reeves is that

their damages did not completely swallow up the debt they owed to
him.

The district court expressly found that Reeves were the

prevailing parties, and that they were entitled to "deduct" from
their debt to Steinfeldt their damages and attorney fees.
63.

R. 2 61-

The award of attorney fees to Reeves as a defending successful

party

was permissible

Builders,

452 P.2d

325

under

the

statute.

(Utah 1969);

Palombi

v.

see also Mountain

Broadcastincr Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56

D

& C

States

(Utah Ct. App.

1989)(there is usually only one prevailing party when a "prevailing
party" is entitled to attorney fees).

The district court awarded

nothing to Steinfeldt, and by no means can the outstanding debt to
Steinfeldt be considered a judgment for purposes of the statute: it
was merely an outstanding debt against which Reeves' judgment was
a setoff.

Indeed, Steinfeldt has failed to attack the district

court's discretion in awarding fees to Reeves (in his brief and
docketing statement he does not cite abuse of discretion as the
applicable standard of review), and instead chooses to quarrel with
the district court's interpretation of the statute in arguing that
the statute contemplates there being two prevailing parties.
noted, such a statutory interpretation is clearly wrong.
to the Reeves—and

As

The award

lack of award to Steinfeldt—was proper and

ought to be upheld.
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CROSS-APPEAL
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is a contested issue in this cross-appeal, and is
addressed in the argument.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Does this court have jurisdiction over this cross-appeal

because the final order was not issued in the trial court until
January 3, 1995, and the notice of cross-appeal was filed January
11, 1995, within the time period prescribed for filing a notice of
appeal or cross-appeal?
There is no standard of review applicable to this issue, since
this Court originally reviews its own jurisdiction.
2.

Did the court clearly err when it awarded as the "cost of

escrowing monies for lien" only $403, when the evidence adduced at
trial shows "cost of escrowing monies for lien" to be over $2,000,
and there is no basis in the record whatsoever for an award of $4 03
for this category of damages.
Questions of damages are inherently factual, and can only be
reversed by an appellate panel if clearly erroneous.

U.R.C.P.

52(a).
3.

Is it clear error if a court fails to award damages for

the delay in closing due to conduct determined to be wrongful when
the evidence of such damages was uncontroverted?
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Questions of damages are inherently factual, and can only be
reversed by an appellate panel if clearly erroneous.

U.R.C.P.

52(a).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 (attached as Appendix 1 ) .
There are no other rules or statutes determinative of the crossappeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

As a threshold matter, the jurisdiction of this court over
this cross-appeal is at issue.

As for the substance of the cross-

appeal, a verdict was entered in favor of Reeves, and they now
contest the propriety of the damage award.
B.

Proceedings Below.

The case was tried to the bench, and the trial court ruled on
liability and damages in favor of Reeves.

Reeves now contest the

damage award.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The procedural facts relevant to the jurisdictional issue have
already been stated in the body of the response brief.
substance of the cross-appeal, the relevant
damages awarded by the trial court.

As for the

facts concern the

At the conclusion of the

trial, the trial court awarded Reeves the following damages:
Cost of Finishing Construction
Cost of escrowing monies for lien
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$1,100.00
$403.00

Attorneys Fees

$6,242.50

(R. 263).
The category of "Cost of escrowing monies for lien" states an
award of $403.

Evidence presented at trial indicates that such

charges actually amounted to $1,842.20. Reeves introduced evidence
that

the

delay

in

closing

the

long-term

financing

caused

by

defendant's conduct which the court found to be wrongful was $403
(the difference between the construction loan interest and the
long-term loan interest during the period of delay in closing).
That category of damages was not included in the trial court's
decision and judgment.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

There were a number of objections and motions filed below

after trial.

These were timed such that a final disposition in

this case was not entered until January 3, 1995.

Because Reeves

filed their notice of cross-appeal on January, 11, 1995, they were
well within any relevant window for filing such notice.

Their

cross-appeal should be heard, and if the appeal is dismissed, the
cross-appeal should be heard as an appeal.
II.

The trial court awarded $403 in damages as the cost of

escrowing money to cover the wrongfully filed lien.

There is no

basis whatsoever in the record for this award, as the evidence
adduced indicates a sum of $1,842.20 for these damages.
III.

Evidence was presented that Reeves suffered $403 in

damages for the 10-day delay in closing caused by the wrongfully-
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filed lien.

The court did not award these damages, despite the

fact that the evidence supporting them was uncontroverted.

This

was clear error.
ARGUMENT
I.

This Court has Jurisdiction Over Reeves' Cross-Appeal.

This Court raised its jurisdiction over Reeves' cross-appeal
sua sponte, and dismissed the cross-appeal on the grounds that the
notice

of

cross-appeal

was not

December 27 notice of appeal.

filed within

ten days

of

the

The Court has now opted to revisit

the issue and allow it to be fully briefed, given the chronology of
the post-trial motions discussed above.

Given that chronology, a

final order disposing of this case was not filed until January 3,
1995.

That means that

the period

for

filing

a

cross-appeal

(accepting that a valid notice of appeal was filed) began to run on
January 3, 1995.

U.R.A.P. 4(d)("[A]ny other party may file a

notice of appeal

. . . within the time otherwise prescribed by

paragraph (a) of this rule . . . . " ) .

The notice of cross-appeal

was filed on January 11, well within the time limit for filing a
notice of appeal or cross-appeal. Thus, the notice of cross-appeal
should be deemed timely and the cross-appeal reinstated, and, if
the appeal is dismissed, the cross-appeal should be treated as an
appeal.
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II. The Trial Court's Award of $403 in Damages for Cost of
Escrowing Money Should Have Been an Award for the Delay in
Closing, and $1842.20 Should Have Been the Award for Cost of
Escrowing Money.
When challenging a factual finding, an appellant is required
to marshal

all of the evidence at all relevant to the

challenged,
position.

including

evidence

contrary

to

the

issue

appellant's

In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).

The evidence relevant to the issue of damages for escrow costs and
closing delay concerned the amount the Reeves were required to
escrow, the amount of interest charged the Reeves for setting that
money

into escrow, and the amount of excess interest

because

of

the

closing

delay.

The

portions

of

the

incurred
record

concerning these damages follow:
1.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.

Notice of Lien.

2.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.

Amended Notice of Lien.

3.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 7.

This indemnity agreement

between Reeves and Steinfeldt provides that no liens will encumber
the house at closing.
4.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 8.

This is an Escrow Agreement

providing that the Reeves are to deposit $26,893.50 into escrow
with Security Title and Abstract.

The escrow was required because

of the presence of the lien on the Reeves property.
5.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.

reflects the escrow amount as item 109.
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This Settlement Statement

6.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 10. This check in the amount of

$7,747.22 was issued to Reeves after Steinfeldt reduced his claim
in the "amended" lien.
7.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 20. These cash advance receipts

reflect the source of a portion of the escrowed monies.

Reeves

borrowed the money to produce the escrowed funds.
8.

Examination of Julie Reeves (R. 346-350, 358-359).

Abstracted: presence of lien required more time with and trips to
title company and bank; required escrowing 1.5 times lien amount
(foundation for Exhibits 8, 9, 7 , ) ; $16,500 was borrowed

from

Security Pacific, and remainder was borrowed from Reeves' business
(foundation for Exhibit 20).
9.

Examination

of

Shawn

Reeves

(R.

396-398).

Abstracted: amount of finance charges on borrowed escrow monies was
$1842.20.

The amount $403 was finance charge for delay in closing.
10.

Closing Argument of Reeves (R. 516-517).

11.

Closing Argument of Steinfeldt (R. 528).

The evidence clearly shows that the amount claimed as interest
on the escrowed monies was $1,842.20, not $403.

The $403 was the

amount of damages incurred for the delay in closing.
concerning

the

$403

amount

and

the

$1,842.20

The testimony
was

close

in

proximity: that proximity may have been the cause of the trial
court's confusion of the amounts.

The fact remains, however, that

the court awarded the incorrect amount as interest on the escrowed
monies.

The error is not only clear: it is obvious and easily
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explicable.

For this reason the Court should vacate the $4 03 award

and remand to the trial court, instructing it to award the Reeves
$1,842.2 0
Likewise,

as

damages

the trial

for

court

escrowing
should

the

have

money

awarded

in
the

separate category "damages caused by delayed closing".

question.5
$403

in a

The remand

should therefore also include an instruction to the trial court to
award

such

damages,

evidence

of

which

was

completely

uncontroverted.
CONCLUSION
Steinfeldt's appeal should not be before this Court. He filed
his notice of appeal prematurely, committing an error fatal to this
Court's jurisdiction.
appeal has no merit.

If he is properly before the Court, then his
He

filed

a mechanic's

lien before

statutorily-prescribed window created for doing so.

the

He claims he

could file at any time, but in so arguing confuses the right to
assert a claim with the statutory prescription of the right to file
a lien.

He contractually bound himself as to the amount of his

claim and when he could assert that claim in the form of a lien.

5

The figure $1,842.20 was undisputed at trial. At the time of
trial the interest on the escrow money was still accruing, as the lien
had not yet been released. There would be a variety of ways to compute
the interest on the $16,500 in question, including the most obvious
method of using the interest rates quoted on the Security Pacific
statements (Exhibit 20) . One could also use the statutory rate. Given
that there was no evidence as to the method of computation, however,
and the fact that the $1,842.20 figure was uncontested, that figure was
the sole evidence of the amount of interest due and should have been
accepted as such. To figure other amounts using various computation
methods (or to try to discern the origin of the $1,842.20) would be
mere speculation.
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The closing date was fixed as the time for payment, and that date
was

also

commencing

the
the

time

of

filing

substantial
window.

completion

His

filing

for

was

excessive, and caused Reeves substantial damages.

purposes

premature

of
and

His subsequent

filing did not constitute a cure of the original, as there is no
authority for such a "cure" and, in any event, Reeves had not
accepted his work at the time of the amended filing.
Reeves cross-appeal is properly before this court because of
the timing of the post-trial motions filed below, and should be
treated as an appeal should Steinfeldt's appeal be dismissed.

The

Reeves damages were unduly diminished by the trial court when it
awarded them only $403 for the cost of escrowing money to cover the
lien and failed to award anything under the category of damages
caused by delayed closing.
finding, the only

amount

No evidence below supported such a
adduced

being

$1,842.20

escrowed money and $403 for delayed closing.

for cost of

That is the amount

the Reeves should receive in addition to the other damages properly
awarded them.
DATED this 15th day of August/v1995.

D. DAVID rSJlBER'EO
EAMBERXjand
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following this 15th
day of August, 1995.
William M. Jeffs, Esq.
Jeffs & Jeffs
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603
ATTORNEY
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APPENDIX
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4

407

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

son might appeal as matter of right. Jensen v.
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968).
Order denying a motion for summary judgment was not a final order and was not appealable. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc.,
571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977).
A summary judgment in favor of one defendant alone is not a final judgment where the
action against the remaining defendant remains alive. Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d
1306 (Utah 1983).
Unsigned minute entry.
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute

Rule 4

an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judgaient for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Manning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State
Tax Comm'n v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah
1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah
1986); Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979
(Utah 1986).
An unsigned minute entry does not constitute a final order for purposes of appeal. State
v. Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987).
C i t e d ^ H u s t o n v L e w i 8 | 8 1 8 p 2d 5 3 1
(Utah 1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending
imposition or execution of sentence, 51
A.L.R.4th 939.

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter .: right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 3hall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b;; vi.> -inder Ruie 32(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall rim from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
t?~ ~riw^ ocurt sh".1.! be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph ia) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the ::*:al court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.

Rule 4

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
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No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 daysfromthe
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Administrative actions.
Attorney fees.
Cross-appeal.
Extension of time to appeal.
—Amendment or modification of judgment.
Filing of notice.
Filing with county clerk.
Final order or judgment.
Post-judgment motions.
Premature notice.
Reconsideration of order.
Timeliness of notice.
—Date of notice.
Cited.
Administrative actions.
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitions for
review of administrative actions. Maverik
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860
P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Attorney fees.
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in defending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v.
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).
Cross-appeal.
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-appeal, a respondent may not attack the judgment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4).
Extension of time to appeal.
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., granting the
court power to extend a time limit where a failure to act in time is due to excusable neglect
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., authorizing the court to relieve from final judgment
for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies
where a notice of appeal has not been timely
filed. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466
P.2d 843 (1970).
A party could not extend the time for filing
an appeal simply by filing a ''Motion for Reconsideration of Order Striking Petition and Motion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v.
Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980).
When the question of "excusable neglect"
arises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard contemplated thereby is a strict one; it is not
meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is too busy, but is to cover emergency situations only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984).
. he time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional
a^u ordinarily cannot be
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
—Amendment or modification of judgment
If an amendment or modification does not
change the substance or character of a judgment, it does not enlarge the time for appeal.

Nielson v. Gurley, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 49
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Filing of notice.
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeal.
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983).
Filing with county clerk.
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely
filing with the juvenile court, where there was
no indication when the clerk transmitted a
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile
court, and the original was returned to appellant's counsel. State, In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Final order or judgment.
Where the trial court signed two different
judgments but neither party served his prepared judgment on the other party before submitting it to the court, the filing of either judgment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken
from either is premature because the judgments are not properly "final." Larsen v.
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983).
Juvenile court's order for temporary confinement in a youth facility for observation and
assessment prior to a final disposition was not
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it
did not finally dispose of all issues, including
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's
rights as parental custodian. State, In re
T.D.C., 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. Appj, cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
An unsigned minute entry is not a final
judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment,
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts
to run on the date when the trial court enters
its first signed order denying the motion.
Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah
1990).
Post-judgment motions.
Where a post-judgment motion was timely
filed under Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P., to upset the
judgment, and notices of appeal from the judgment were filed after the motion was made, but
before the disposition of the motion, the motion
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, and
notice of appeal had to be filed within the required time from the date of the entry that
disposed of the motion. U-M Invs. v. Ray, 658
P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982).
The time for appeal of an order corifirming
an arbitrator's award runs from the order
denying appellant's timely motion to alter or
amend that judgment under Rule 59, U.R.C.P.
Robinson & Wells v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844
(Utah 1983).
71.~ Supreme Court may not consider an ap~~-' "om the di;missal of a complaint for
unpaid overtime compensation until the trial
court has had an opportunity to review the order in question by ruling on all pending postjudgment motions. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc.,
694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984).
A notice of appeal filed before the disposition
of a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective

